Free will

If the problem with consciousness is how it arises from the physical world, the problem with free will is whether it is even compatible with the laws of physical world. And if the problem with consciousness is what its nature is, the problem with free will is what do we even mean by it. We all take free will for granted: we assume that we are in control of our actions and that we are morally responsible for them. But then the usual assumption of philosophers and scientist is that the physical world is deterministic. That means that for any given state of the universe, if we knew the value of every variable necessary to describe it, or, as Laplace puts it, "all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed", as well as the actual laws of the physical universe, if we fed that into an infinitely large and powerful computer it would be able to calculate with absolute precision every subsequent state of the universe to the tiniest detail. Not only would that hypothetical computer be able to accurately predict the position of such and such galaxies in a millions years, but also the exact movement of the finger of X. pulling the trigger of the gun that will shoot Y., the nerve impulses that will make Z. whisper words of comfort to his friend A. It will predict every crime, every act of love and generosity, every word, every feeling, every effort, every defeat.

Needless to say, that computer cannot possibly be built, but the point is not whether the future is knowable by any intellegence, natural or artificial, but that it is predetermined--already written, as it were. Now, that is not a fact, only an assumption. There is no way we will ever be able to know with certainty whether physical laws alone determine the future. It is assumption, however that most scientists and philosophers take as self-evident reality. Let's join them for a while in their assumption and imagine that we lived in a deterministic universe. Would that imply that we don't actually have free will? Before attempting to provide an answer (which, incidentally, I won't) let's flesh out the problem.

Most of us understand free will as the ability to decide which course of action to take, particularly when faced with situations in which there are conflicting motivations within oneself. That would typically be between self-interest and morality, or between a long term higher good and an immediate lower good. In these situations we feel like we have a choice. Even when the urge to choose the selfish or unwise option is very intense (you are trying to give up smoking but find it impossible to resist the temptation to have another fag) we still feel we have a choice. That is why we call it an urge or temptation, because we have the choice to resist it; otherwise we would call it a reflex. We can always choose whether to fight our base instincts or surrender to them, whether to put in a bit more effort or give up. Even when we surrender, we still have the impression that we could have done otherwise.

That is what we intuitively understand free will to be. However, from a physicalist/determinist perspective what's going on in those situations is not at all a battle of will power (a battle of what power?), but nerve impulses travelling across the brain in strict accordance to the laws of physics; matter and energy mechanistically proceeding along their predetermined course. Cause, effect, cause, effect. Neat, mathematical, inescapable. Whatever you do, fight the battle or give up, it was meant to be, and you couldn't physically have done otherwise, even if you had the impression that you could. Now, this is tricky. Imagine that you do something nasty to somebody, hurt your partner's feelings, behave like an idiot, whatever:

"Why did you do that?"
"It was predetermined, just like everything else. I couldn't have done otherwise."
"Yes, you could!"
"You don't understand. I was physically predetermined to do it!"
"You could have chosen no to do it, and then that would be what was predetermined."
"That's a logical phallacy."
"I don't think so. And even if it was and you were really predetermined to do it, you still have behaved like an arsehole and the least you could do now is apologise."
"No I can't. I'm predetermined not to. Can't you see?"
"You frigging idiot! If you just apologise now then that'll be pretedermined too! Whatever you do you'll always be able to say it was predetermined, so why not do the predetermined right thing instead of behaving like a predetermined cretin?"
"You're being so unfair and judgemental. I would like to apologise, but I can't. All the things I have said to you really were predetermined, as is what I'm saying now. I can't possibly stop the laws of physics determining my thoughts and my actions."
"Okay then, you be a predetermined cretin."

Tricky indeed. It sounds reasonable to say "If everything is predetermined there's nothing I can do to change the course of events, so I may just as well stop striving to achieve what is predetermined anyway," whereas it sounds incoherent to say "Knowing that the future is predetermined I will try my hardest to achieve what is already predetermined." One doesn't strive to achieve what is predetermined; that's ridiculous. One strives precisely to have an impact on what would otherwise be the course of things. And you can indeed change the course of things if you try, but the trying and the change are predetermined as well. You are predeterminedly predetermining the future. Does that sound convincing?

We could also say that there is no contradiction between determinism and free will, or that determinism, even if it is true in some sense, is irrelevant to our lives. How can this be? The reason why determinism sounds so depressing is because it seems to divest us of our free will, but that is just one way of looking at it. For free will to exist we should be free to choose, not the physical laws. But what are we? What is the deciding agent in us? Not our toes or our lungs, are they? It is our mind, our personality, our feelings, our thinking. That is what decides, whether or not we believe in determinism. But then thinking is a function performed by the brain, which is physical and abides by the physical laws. It doesn't make sense to say that we are helpless against the neural and, more fundamentally, physical processes that take place in our brains, because we are those processes. (Or are we?)

Nonetheless, if a robot one day said she is depressed because she is powerless against the predeterminedness of the decisions made by her circuitry, we wouldn't tell her she's being stupid and look for the bug in her software that is causing such misperception--not me anyway. On the contrary, we would sympathise with that longing for true freedom, whatever that is, and acknowledge the emerging existential and moral dimension of that computer. Perhaps the moment one feels free or longs for freedom, something new arises, and our existence takes on a new dimension. It seems that to reduce that dimension to the physical is at least misrepresenting it.

So what if the world was not deterministic and we were really, truly, existentially, morally free? Where would our choices come from if not from the physical activity of the brain? We've already discussed that counsciousness can't be convincingly reduced to the physical (convincingly meaning "in a way way that convinces me", of course), and that since we think and talk about consciousness it does influence the physical world. In other words, there is something non-physical, the laws of which we know nothing about, that has an impact in the (allegedly) otherwise physically explainable universe. If consciousness, something that is obviously not physical, and obviously has an impact on the physical realm, exists, then a non-deterministic view of the universe seems plausible. Perhaps free will is not an illusion, in the same way that consciousness, despite being such a philosophical inconvenience, is not an illusion.

But then an interesting problem arises. Imagine that Ralph encounters a situation in which he must make a decision of ethical significance. He, for example, has the chance to steal some money that would buy him a very nice 10mm lens for his camera. After some inner struggle he opted for the unethical course of action, he grabs the money and leaves the scene whistling a tune. Let's now play God: let's grab the remote control of the universe, go back in time to the moment just before Ralph's temptation, and hit "play". What would he do this time? If we repeat the experiment several times and Ralph always walks away with the money in his pocket, it would seem that he was predetermined to do it--he couldn't have chosen otherwise. But what if he sometimes nicked the money and sometimes didn't? Would that proof the existence of free will or that of chaos? I don't know about you, but if I look at it like this I almost find determinism more reassuring than the alternative (indeterminism, undeterminism, antideterminism?). It seems to me, however, that there's something fishy about this thought experiment. It sounds way too simplistic. And the moment we are playing God in this manner, replaying poor Ralph's predicament over and over again, free will kind of goes down the toilet anyway.

So what do I believe about free will then? This might sound like a cop-out, but the answer that I find more intellectually honest and more spiritually meaningful is that the truth about free will (as well as other existential issues) probably lies beyond what our logical minds will ever be able understand or verify. There are reasons to be optimistic and pessimistic, to believe in one thing or the other, but I think that if you believe in a theory that exaplains free will away you are clinging to illusory certainties.